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RIDDEN WITH CONTROVERSY: APPLYING THE PUBLIC
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Remy T. B. Oliver*
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INTRODUCTION
Judgment Day is Coming in May.1
Choose Adoption . . . It Works!2
I didnt serve my country to stab goats.
Department of Defense: End Live Tissue Training above an image
of a soldier in fatigues.3
These three examples are among the controversial advertisements subjected to
First Amendment litigation in the past decade. The reactions of the general public upon
viewing controversial advertisements can often be intense.4 In 2010, the Washington
Metro Area Transit Authority (WMATA) received hundreds of angry phone calls
and letters complaining about advertisements that were critical of the Catholic
Churchs position on condom usage.5 The situation eventually devolved to the point
where WMATA security personnel feared that certain ads would, due to world
events, incite individuals to violence on the system.6 While an often overlooked
subject in free speech jurisprudence, it is clear that tensions can run high when buses
and subway trains are involved.
1

See Ne. Pa. Freethought Socy v. Cnty. of Lackawanna Transit Sys., 327 F. Supp. 3d 767,
772 (M.D. Pa. 2018).
2
See id. at 780.
3
PETA, PETA Files Suit After D.C. Metro Outrageously Refuses to Run Ads, Violating the
First Amendment (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.peta.org/blog/peta-sues-transit-agency-for-re
jecting-ads/ [https://perma.cc/9F5T-9Y9R].
4
See Archdiocese of Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 897 F.3d 314, 319 (D.C.
Cir. 2018) (citing a survey where 58% of respondents opposed issue-oriented ads and 46%
of respondents were extremely opposed to issue-oriented ads).
5
See id.
6
See id. (internal quotation omitted) (referencing a proposed advertisement featuring a
drawing of the Prophet Muhammad, considered gravely offensive to many faithful Muslims).
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This Note tackles the application of the First Amendment to public transit advertising. Under the current judicial framework, the First Amendment is filtered through
the public forum doctrine when discussing the rights of citizens to utilize government property for expressive purposes.7 The Note will argue that public transit
advertising constitutes a designated public forum in most (if not all) cases.8 That
characterization would force any content-based restrictions to be narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling government interest.9 The natural result is a significant expansion of access to public transit advertising by interested parties. If the U.S. Supreme
Court were to grant certiorari to resolve the circuit split, as it declined to do in
2016,10 it should hold that most public transit systems are categorically a designated
public forum.11
Part I discusses the origins of, and the basic approach to, application of the public
forum doctrine.12 Part II discusses the majority approach of circuit courts, finding that
public transit systems are a designated public forum. 13 Part III discusses the minority
approach of circuit courts, asserting that public transit systems are a non-public
forum.14 Part IV discusses the government speech doctrine in the context of public
transit advertising, including the extent to which it is applicable in that context.15
Part V discusses the issue of the captive audience and potential avenues to distinguish controversial public transit advertising from other types of offensive content.16
The Conclusion provides a clear overview of the four-part majority approach and
cleanly integrates the major issues of government speech and captivity into the
overall analysis.17
This Note uses the term public transit (commonly referred to as mass transit)
to mean the transportation of large numbers of people by means of buses, subway
trains, etc., especially within urban areas and the system, vehicles, or facilities engaged in such transportation.18 All public transit is presumed to be subject to the
7

See generally Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
See generally Planned Parenthood Assn/Chi. Area v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d
1225 (7th Cir. 1985); Air Line Pilots Assn v. Dept of Aviation of Chi., 45 F.3d 1144 (7th Cir.
1995); Christs Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 1998).
9
See Greer, 424 U.S. at 847 (Powell, J., concurring).
10
See American Freedom Def. Initiative v. King Cnty., 136 S. Ct. 1022, 1025 (2016)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that transit authorities that open
their ad spaces to political messages must provide compelling justifications for restricting ads,
and must narrowly tailor any restrictions to those justifications).
11
See discussion infra Part II.
12
See discussion infra Part I.
13
See discussion infra Part II.
14
See discussion infra Part III.
15
See discussion infra Part IV.
16
See discussion infra Part V.
17
See discussion infra Conclusion.
18
Mass Transit, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mass
%20transit [https://perma.cc/9CX2-FA5N] (last visited Dec. 13, 2021).
8
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First Amendment, either via direct ownership by a government, or a close relationship creating state action on the part of a private actor.19
I. THE ORIGINS AND APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
A. Get Off Uncle Sams Lawn: The Background to the Public Forum Doctrine
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.20 While the text itself is clear, courts
since the late 1960s have artificially constrained the freedom of speech within a
judicial straitjacket known as the public forum doctrine.21 This doctrine is an analytical
tool used to determine the constitutionality of speech restrictions implemented on
government property and, thus, whether groups have the right to engage in expressive activities on such property.22 It is a complicated prism of judicial analysis that
requires background knowledge of First Amendment jurisprudence.23
Until the 1939 decision Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, the
Supreme Court had expressed skepticism that citizens had any right whatsoever to
the use of government property, likening the government to a private landowner.24
In Davis v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court adopted the logic of Justice Holmes
when it affirmed the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court.25 In Holmes
view: [f]or the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in
a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of
the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house.26 In other
words, Uncle Sam could tell private citizens to get off his lawn at his pleasure. 27
Hague was a seminal decision; for the first time, the Court recognized some right
of citizens collectively to enjoy government property.28 Justice Roberts succinctly
enumerated this principle when, in dictum in Hague, he famously wrote:
Wherever the title of street and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out
19

See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 715 (1961).
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21
See generally Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and
Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987).
22
See David L. Hudson, Jr., Public Forum Doctrine, THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/824/public-forum-doctrine
[https://perma.cc/FQM2-MG92].
23
See generally Post, supra note 21.
24
307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939).
25
See generally 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
26
See Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895).
27
See id.
28
See Hague, 307 U.S. at 514.
20
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of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such
use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a
part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.29
This idea was supported, in less enthusiastic language, by later decisions in Jamison v.
Texas30 and Niemotko v. Maryland.31 The revolution in public forum doctrine occurred
during the turmoil of the 1960s Civil Rights movement, when the right of the public
to peaceably assemble on government property became a major judicial flashpoint.32
Edwards v. South Carolina33 and Cox v. Louisiana34 laid the groundwork for the
public forum doctrine, with Harry Kalven Jr., a legal scholar, coining the term public
forum shortly after the two decisions were laid down.35 Kalven endorsed the idea
that in an open democratic society the streets, the parks, and other public places are
an important facility for public discussion and political process. They are . . . a public
forum that the citizen can commandeer. . . .36 This idea was gradually adopted by
the Supreme Court, albeit in fits and starts.37 Through the 1960s and early 1970s, the
Court debated the extent to which the government could restrict expressive activity,
especially when weighty public policy concerns were in the mix.38 In 1976, however, the Supreme Court resolved this debate by finalizing the modern form of
public forum doctrine in Greer v. Spock.39
29

Id. at 515.
318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943) (But one who is rightfully on a street . . . carries with him
there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion . . .
extend[ing] to the communication of ideas by handbills and literature as well as by the
spoken word.).
31
340 U.S. 268, 276 (1951) (Stating that the issue before the Court is [h]ow to reconcile
the interest in allowing free expression of ideas in public places with the protection of . . . the
primary uses of streets and parks).
32
See generally Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316
U.S. 52 (1942); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); see also Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept
of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2.
33
372 U.S. 229 (1963).
34
379 U.S. 559 (1964).
35
See Kalven, supra note 32, at 10.
36
Id. at 1112.
37
See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) (The State, no less than a private owner
of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated.); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (The right
to use a public place for expressive activity may be restricted only for weighty reasons.);
Police Dept of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (Once a forum is opened up to assembly
or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say.).
38
See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96.
39
See generally 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
30
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B. A Judicial Straitjacket: Modern Public Forum Doctrine
In Greer, the Court began to outline what has become a three-tiered system
which would go on to form the doctrinal framework for public forum analysis.40 The
public forum doctrine divides government property into three distinct categories: (1)
quintessential public forums (i.e., public streets and parks); (2) designated public
forums (i.e., municipal theaters, school board meetings, and university meeting facilities); and (3) non-public forums (i.e., military bases).41 Quintessential public forums
permit the most expressive activity, while non-public forums permit the least.42
Quintessential public forums are places long devoted to assembly and debate,
or which have immemorially been held in trust for expressive purposes.43 In a quintessential public forum, the government may not ban all communicative activity
because there is a First Amendment right of guaranteed access by members of the public.44 Content-based regulations of speech must be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest and any content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions are
permissible only if they are narrowly tailored with ample alternative channels for
expressive activity.45
Designated, sometimes called limited, public forums are places that the government has opened to the public to use for expressive purposes. 46 The government is
not constitutionally required to open such places, and can close them to expressive
activity at any time.47 In practice, a designated public forum may be opened to the
public as a whole, therefore operating no differently than a traditional public forum.48 Proscribed use of the designated public forum may also be more limited in
scope, open only to certain groups or the discussion of certain subjects.49 Contentbased regulations of speech must be narrowly drawn to meet a compelling state
40

See generally id.
Perry Educ. Assn v. Perry Loc. Educators Assn, 460 U.S. 37, 4546 (1983).
42
See id. at 37, 46.
43
Id. at 45 (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). See also
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Government Sponsored Social Media and Public Forum Doctrine
Under the First Amendment: Perils and Pitfalls, 19 PUB. LAW. 2, 4 (2011).
44
See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
45
See Post, supra note 21, at 1760 (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983)).
46
See Lidsky, supra note 43, at 4; see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 4546 n.7).
47
See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976).
48
See Lidsky, supra note 43, at 4.
49
See id. (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7). But see generally Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981) (striking down a schools exclusion of religious groups from facilities open
to all other student groups); City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Pub. Empt Rels.
Commn, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (allowing a non-union teacher to speak at a public meeting
of the school board opposing a demand by the teachers union).
41
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interest, and content-neutral regulations are permissible if assessed to be reasonable
by a court.50
Non-public forums are places that are neither traditional nor designated public
forums.51 The government in a non-public forum is essentially in the position of a
private property owner relative to the general public.52 Reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions are permissible, and subject matter regulation of speech is allowed
so long as the regulation is reasonable and does not constitute an effort to suppress
speech because government officials arbitrarily oppose the speakers viewpoint.53
While this framework has been both criticized54 and defended,55 it remains the
analytical tool federal courts use to determine which types of speech restrictions are
permissible on government property.56 As many scholars note, the doctrine has a
tendency to distract courts from the first amendment values at stake in a given case.57
Despite the knowledge that public forum doctrine is crude, historically ossified,
and seemingly unconnected to any thematic view of the free expression guarantee,
there has been no indication that courts are searching for an alternative framework.58
This Note will not attempt to fight that particular battle. Rather, within the
existing public forum framework, this Note argues that when public transit advertising campaigns do not categorically exclude certain types of advertisements, they
create a designated public forum that prevents content-based discrimination absent
a compelling public interest.59 This approach should then be adopted to resolve the
current circuit split on the issue should the Supreme Court receive a ripe appeal from
a circuit court decision.60
50

See Post, supra note 21, at 1748.
See Lidsky, supra note 43, at 4.
52
See Perry Educ. Assn v. Perry Loc. Educators Assn, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); Greer,
424 U.S. at 836.
53
See Post, supra note 21, at 1751.
54
See, e.g., TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT
LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES 5556 (2009); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 93 (1987); C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 109, 110 (1986); Daniel W. Park,
Government Speech and the Public Forum: A Clash Between Democratic and Egalitarian
Values, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 113, 11415 (2009).
55
See generally Lillian R. Bevier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense of
Categories, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 79.
56
See Park, supra note 54, at 114.
57
See Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum
Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1224
(1984).
58
See Calvin Massey, Public Fora, Neutral Governments, and the Prism of Property, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 309, 310 (1999).
59
See discussion infra Conclusion.
60
See discussion infra Conclusion.
51

474

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:467

II. THE MAJORITY CIRCUIT APPROACH
Under the majority circuit approach, followed by the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and
D.C. Circuits, a public transit agencys acceptance of a wide array of political and issuerelated advertisements is evidence that the government intended to create a designated (rather than limited) public forum because political advertisements . . . [are]
the hallmark of a public forum.61 Any restriction on advertising content must be
supported by a compelling justification, and must be narrowly tailored to those
justifications.62 What is compelling is difficult to define with precision. However,
it seems to involve cases where the interest is more than an exercise of discretion or
preference.63 Cases from the Seventh and Third Circuits will be used to demonstrate
the application of the majority circuit approach.64
A. Planned Parenthood Association/Chicago Area v. Chicago Transit Authority65
The Planned Parenthood Association case clearly shows the dangers of allowing
potentially biased employees to serve as gatekeepers for the publics speech.66 The
Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) contracted with Winston Network, Inc. (Winston)
to maintain advertising space on its properties throughout Chicago, including car
cards on the interiors of its buses and subway trains.67 Commercial advertisers paid
the full rate, while non-profit organizations could advertise for a nominal fee that
covered Winstons costs in posting the advertisements.68 It was Winstons policy to
accept all commercial advertising that did not raise questions of vulgarity or legality,
but Winston often sought the CTAs express approval for non-profit advertisements.69
The Planned Parenthood Association of the Chicago Area (PPA) contacted
Winston about placing an advertisement on CTA buses and trains.70 Winstons
61

See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. King Cnty., 136 S. Ct. 1022, 1024 (2016) (Thomas,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban
Mobility Auth. for Regl Transp., 698 F.3d 885, 890 (6th Cir. 2012)).
62
See id. at 1025 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
63
See generally Robert T. Miller, What is a Compelling Government Interest?, 21 J.
MKTS. & MORALITY 71 (2018); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (in
the context of large impersonal organizations, promoting gender equality was a compelling
governmental interest that justified restricting freedom of association); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (achieving a diverse student body in a public law school justified the
governments considering of race in admissions decisions).
64
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Assn/Chi. Area v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225,
1232 (7th Cir. 1985); Air Line Pilots Assn, Intl v. Dept of Aviation of Chi., 45 F.3d 1144,
115455 (7th Cir. 1995); Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1369 (3d Cir. 1990).
65
See generally 592 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ill. 1984), affd, 767 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1985).
66
See generally 767 F.2d at 1225.
67
See id. at 1227.
68
See id.
69
See id.
70
See id.
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liaison with the CTA forwarded the proposed advertisementwhich mentioned the
availability of family-planning servicesto the CTA, where it was rejected.71 A
revised advertisementwhich mentioned the availability of counseling about
prenatal care, abortion, or adoptionalso was rejected.72 PPA then filed an action
against CTA, alleging a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.73 In its
answer, the CTA responded that it had rejected PPAs proposed advertisements by
applying its long-standing, consistently-enforced policy . . . to reject controversial
public issue advertisements.74
B. Family PlanningToo Controversial for the CTA?
The CTA claimed that its property was a non-public forum rather than a designated public forum, which would severely limit the PPAs ability to bring a First
Amendment claim.75 A designated public forum is government property that has
not traditionally been regarded as a public forum but that has been intentionally
opened up for that purpose by a government actor.76 To create a designated public
forum, the government must intentionally open up a location or communication
channel for use by the public at large.77 The scope of the relevant forum is defined
by the access sought by the speaker.78 The government can claim that a limited
public forum has been establishedthus allowing substantial restrictions on speech
only if the government limits its property to use by certain groups or dedicate[s it]
solely to the discussion of certain subjects.79
In analyzing the CTAs policy, both the district and appellate courts referred
back to the three-tiered approach common in public forum jurisprudence.80 Citing
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators Association,81 the Seventh
Circuit noted that [i]f public property is a public forum, either traditionally or by
designation, the government bears a heavy burden in justifying restrictions on speech
71

See id.
See id.
73
See id.
74
See id. (internal quotation omitted).
75
Id. at 123132.
76
See Christian Legal Socy of Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 n.11 (2010)
(internal quotation omitted) (quoting City of Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469
(2009)).
77
See Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Cornelius v.
NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1984)).
78
See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801.
79
See Christian Legal Socy, 561 U.S. at 679 n.11 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Summum, 555 U.S. at 470).
80
See Planned Parenthood Assn/Chi. Area, 592 F. Supp. 544, 55253 (N.D. Ill. 1984);
Planned Parenthood Assn, 767 F.2d at 123132.
81
460 U.S. 37 (1983).
72
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therein.82 Unfortunately for lower courts, Perry does not clearly establish guidelines for determining when government property has become a designated public
forum.83 Rather, courts have found it helpful to consider the uses to which the
property has previously been put84 as well as whether the proposed speech is inconsistent or incompatible with the primary use of the government facility.85 The
public forum analysis is therefore a fact-intensive inquiry.86
First, the CTAs actions must be analyzed to see whether it intentionally
opened up its advertising to the public at large.87 The Seventh Circuit noted that if
there was a policy of rejecting controversial public-issue ads, it was neither consistently enforced nor applied to any issue except abortion. 88 Casting a skeptical eye
on the policy asserted by the CTA in the action, the district court stated that the
CTAs policy was really nonexistent and [was] contrived for this action.89 The
policy [had] never been written and no guidelines exist[ed] for its application at
the time of litigation.90 As a result of the policy being articulated differently by
different CTA and Winston officers and employees, the end result was a non-policy
that effectively allowed purely subjective decisions as to what advertising to accept
or reject.91 Other cases demonstrate that this particular kind of inconsistent content
policy creates a designated public forum.92
For further evidence of this proposition, the CTA had in the past accepted advertisements from other family planning organizations, including the Illinois Family Planning Council.93 While this inconsistent application was not fatal to the CTAs case, it
did weigh against the CTA.94 What was more damaging to the CTA was the consistent
82

See Planned Parenthood Assn, 767 F.2d at 1232.
See Perry, 460 U.S. 4546.
84
See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 263 (1981); Jarman v. Williams, 753 F.2d
76, 79 (8th Cir. 1985); Intl Socy for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition
Auth., 691 F.2d 155, 15860 (3d Cir. 1982).
85
See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976); Eastern Conn. Citizens Action
Grp. v. Powers, 723 F.2d 1050, 105354 (2d Cir. 1983); United States Sw. Africa/Namibia
Trade & Cultural Council v. United States, 708 F.2d 760, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
86
See Greer, 424 U.S. at 828.
87
See City of Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009).
88
See Planned Parenthood Assn/Chi. Area v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225,
1228 (7th Cir. 1985).
89
See Planned Parenthood Assn/Chi. Area v. Chicago Transit Auth., 592 F. Supp. 544,
549 (N.D. Ill. 1984), affd, 767 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1985).
90
See id.
91
See id.
92
See, e.g., New York Magazine v. Metro. Transit Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1998)
(Allowing political speech . . . evidences a general intent to open a space for discourse, and
a deliberate acceptance of the possibility of clashes of opinion and controversy that the Court
in Lehman recognized as inconsistent with sound commercial practice.).
93
See Planned Parenthood Assn, 592 F. Supp. at 550.
94
See Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach Cnty., 387 F.3d 1208, 121213 (11th Cir. 2004)
83
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acceptance of the types of advertising it claimed to prohibit over a long period of time.95
The CTA claimed it had a policy of declining the subset of controversial public
issue advertising.96 Despite this stated policy, the CTA entirely lacked written standards
for its officers to ascertain which advertisements were sufficiently controversial
to bar from publication.97 The CTA had recorded only two prior rejections of
advertisements, one related to the Vietnam Warlater posted pursuant to a settlement
agreementand one calling for the impeachment of President Nixon, later posted
pursuant to a court order.98 The PPA advertisement was denied publication despite
perhaps more controversial advertisements being approved by CTA on a regular
basis.99 This was extremely damaging to the CTAs claim that it had created a nonpublic forum.100
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the CTAs actions had created a
designated public forum.101 This was the correct outcome because of the lack of
consistently enforced written policy guidelines and the acceptance of at least some
political advertising.102 The CTA maintained no written policy on advertisements,
the only restriction being the informal directive to Winston to refuse vulgar, immoral,
or disreputable advertising.103 As a result of the laissez-faire policy of granting
space to virtually everyone willing to pay, the CTA opened the forum to a huge
range of commercial, public-service, public-issue, and political ads. 104 Thus, the
advertisements on the CTAs buses and subway cars became a channel of communication for the general public and a designated public forum.105
The CTAs counter-argument relied heavily on the Supreme Courts decision
in Lehman v. Shaker Heights.106 The Court distinguished Lehman in noting that
Shaker Heights had a consistently enforced written policy of rejecting all political
(quoting Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (The government does not
create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally
opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.)).
95
See Planned Parenthood Assn, 592 F. Supp. at 54951.
96
See Planned Parenthood Assn/Chi. Area v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225,
1229 (7th Cir. 1985).
97
See id. at 122930.
98
See Impeach Nixon Comm. v. Buck, 498 F.2d 37, 3738 (7th Cir. 1974); Planned
Parenthood Assn, 767 F.2d at 1230.
99
See Planned Parenthood Assn, 767 F.2d at 1230 (for example, an ad showing bombs
falling on a child had been accepted).
100
See also New York Magazine v. Metro. Transit Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 12930 (2d Cir.
1998).
101
Planned Parenthood Assn, 767 F.2d at 1232.
102
See id. at 1230; New York Magazine, 136 F.3d at 12930.
103
See Planned Parenthood Assn, 767 F.2d at 1232.
104
See id.
105
See id.; see also Coalition for Abortion Rts. & Against Sterilization Abuse v. Niagara
Frontier Transp. Auth., 584 F. Supp. 985, 989 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
106
See generally 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
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and public issue advertising.107 Additionally, in the twenty-six years prior to the
case, Shaker Heights had not permitted any political or public issue advertising on
its vehicles.108 As such, the Seventh Circuit noted that the Lehman decision stands
for the proposition that the interior of a transit systems cars and buses is not a
traditional public forum but not that such space may never become a public
forum.109 Fortunately, the court in this case managed to avoid a pitfall that many
others had fallen into.110
Another important consideration is whether the proposed speech is inconsistent
or incompatible with the primary use of the government facility.111 Advertising was
not incompatible with the primary use(s) of the CTAs facilities because the CTA
already permits its facilities to be used for public-issue and political advertising. 112
In an era of declining local government revenue, most public agencies have an eagerness for additional revenue that creates a symbiotic relationship with individuals
eager to provide money in exchange for the display of advertising.113 While the CTA
was unwilling to accept PPAs proposed ad even at the higher [commercial] rate,
they obviously stood to profit handsomely for accepting most types of advertisements due to the low costs involved in posting ads.114 Even when running political
advertisements, other transit systems had experienced only minor . . . graffiti on
some signs, which had a minimal impact on advertising-related revenue.115 Therefore, operating public transit advertising as a designated public forum would allow
more speech without adversely impacting its core purpose.116
As the CTA [did] not attempt to justify its exclusion of PPAs message as a
narrowly tailored, content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction, the Seventh
Circuit held that the CTAs refusal to run PPAs advertisements was a violation of
the First Amendment.117 The CTAs counter-arguments were unconvincing, and did
not appear to outweigh the CTAs policy of deliberately opening advertising on its
107

See id. at 301.
See id. at 30001.
109
See Planned Parenthood Assn, 767 F.2d at 1233; see also Gay Activists All. of Wash.,
D.C., Inc. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 78-2217, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15415,
at *1113 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Thus, although the interiors of Metro Buses are not a traditional
public forum . . . a city or regional transit system nevertheless may create a public forum for
the advertising [of] asocial or political speech by the acceptance of other advertisements
dealing with social or political issues.).
110
See Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 7677 (1st Cir. 2004).
111
See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 843 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
112
Planned Parenthood Assn, 767 F.2d at 1232.
113
See CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. N.J. Transit Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64155, at *18 (D.
N.J. 2007).
114
See Planned Parenthood Assn, 767 F.2d at 1227 n.2.
115
See Planned Parenthood Assn/Chi. Area v. Chicago Transit Auth., 592 F. Supp. 544,
551 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
116
See discussion supra Section II.B.
117
See Planned Parenthood Assn, 767 F.2d at 1233.
108
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public transit system to the general public for expressive purposes.118 The circuit
courts analysis in this particular case is a strong example of the majority approach,
and lays out the basic foundation for what other courts should ideally follow. 119
C. Air Line Pilots Association, International v. Department of Aviation of the
City of Chicago120
The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) was the collective bargaining representative for the pilots of Air Wisconsin, Inc. (Air Wisconsin).121 Air Wisconsin had its
fleet sold off in 1993, with United Airlines (UA) retaining rights to the name.122 In
its representative capacity, ALPA sought to place an advertisement honoring the Air
Wisconsin pilots in a diorama display case at Chicago OHare Airport (OHare), a
municipal airport wholly owned by the City of Chicago (the City).123 The advertisement was highly critical of UA, depicting the dismantling of an Air Wisconsin plane
beneath a headline reading: It wasnt broke until they fixed it.124
After designing the advertisement, ALPA entered into a contractworth $1,440
for a two month display periodfor a diorama of unknown content with Transportation Media Incorporated (TMI).125 TMI controlled all advertising in OHare on
behalf of the City.126 The City policy on advertising was that [u]se of all advertising
material is subject to approval by office of Commissioner of Aviation, City of
Chicago, and [is] subject to its orders of removal if deemed unaesthetic or objectionable for any reason whatsoever.127 After TMI had signed a contract with ALPA and
the installation was set to begin, a representative of the City ordered TMI not to
118

See id.
See discussion supra Section II.B.
120
See Air Line Pilots Assn v. Dept of Aviation of Chi., No. 93 C 6696, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 512 (N.D. Ill. January 18, 1994), vacated and remanded, 45 F.3d 1144 (7th Cir.
1995).
121
See Air Line Pilots Assn, 45 F.3d at 1147.
122
See id.
123
See id.; CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF AVIATION, OHare History, https://www.flychi
cago.com/business/CDA/Pages/OHare.aspx [https://perma.cc/S9HP-SK8C] (last visited
Dec. 13, 2021).
124
See Air Line Pilots Assn, 45 F.3d at 1147. The full text of the advertisement stated:
Air Wisconsin employees built their company into one of the largest regional airlines in the nation, but UAL Corp. broke it into pieces and sold
parts of it to others for its own benefit. Hundreds of Air Wisconsin employees lost their jobs. This advertisement is dedicated to the workers
at Air Wisconsin and other airlines who have lost the ability to support
their families because of corporate greed and indifference.
Id.
125
See id. at 1148.
126
See id.
127
See id.
119
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install it.128 ALPA alleged this action was the result of pressure from UA, which paid
the City approximately $4,000,000 a year for advertising.129 The diorama was eventually displayed, but was removed after a few hours, implied to be as a result of City
pressure.130 While ALPA made numerous attempts to have the diorama displayed
including changing the headline to Dismantled, but not forgottenALPA was
unable to convince TMI to restore the diorama.131 ALPA then brought suit against
the Department of Aviation and TMI, alleging a violation of its First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.132
D. Dismantled: A Memorial Advertisement Too Offensive for the Department of
Aviation?
The error of the district court in this case emphasizes the need for a thorough,
fact-specific inquiry whenever the issue of whether a space is a public forum is
raised.133 On first impression, a district court cannot rely on sweeping categorizations in precedent to dismiss claims out of hand.134 The district court erroneously
dismissed ALPAs claims, relying on the Supreme Courts holding in International
Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee.135 The district court interpreted Krishna
as holding that airport terminals were categorically not public forums.136 The fact that
a municipal entity allowed largely unregulated advertising displays and dioramasas
well as a host of other commercial enterprisesin the interior corridors of the
airport was considered to be irrelevant.137 Thus, the district court ruled OHare was
a non-public forum and dismissed ALPAs claims.138
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court.139 It distinguished the
Krishna holding by noting the difference between general access and limited
128

See id.
See id.
130
See id.
131
See id.
132
See id.
133
See Air Line Pilots Assn v. Dept of Aviation of Chi., No. 93 C 6696, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 512, at *45 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 1994).
134
Air Line Pilots Assn, 45 F.3d at 1160. But see Air Line Pilots Assn, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 512, at *45.
135
See Air Line Pilots Assn, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 512, at *5; Intl Socy for Krishna
Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 672, 67677 (1992) (explaining that the Hare Krishnas
sought a declaratory judgment that a regulation limiting distribution of literature and solicitation
at an airport to areas outside the terminals was a violation of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court held that airports were not traditional public forums because their traditional
purpose was not to promote the free exchange of ideas but to facilitate air travel and, therefore,
the regulation needed only to be reasonable.).
136
See Air Line Pilots Assn, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 512, at *67.
137
See id. at *6.
138
See id. at *78.
139
See Air Line Pilots Assn, 45 F.3d at 1160.
129
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access.140 Especially important was the very thing the district court had glossed over:
the forum at issue.141 The relevant expressive forum was not using the concourse for
the purpose of activities like solicitation and the distribution of literature as was the case
in Krishna.142 Rather, the relevant expressive forum was [using] one of the [terminal]
display cases to communicate [a] message.143 The district courts error was in defining the desired access too broadly.144 It is critical for courts to closely scrutinize the
plaintiffs claims because forum should be defined in terms of the access sought
by the speaker.145 Even if a piece of government property considered as a whole is not
a public forum, channels for public communicationor alternative foramay well
exist within [that] . . . piece of government property.146 Hence, the error of the district
court began with this overbroad categorization of the public forum at issue. 147
With the forum at issue clarified, it became immediately clear why the Seventh
Circuit found that TMIs practices could have given rise to a designated public
forum.148 While a public forum does not arise due to inaction, the supervising
agencys policy must be of more substance than a strategy adopted or relied upon
for the purposes of litigation.149 While the City claimed there was a policy of excluding political advertisements, the City presented absolutely no evidence that such
a policy was ever enforced at OHare.150 Further, it appeared that TMI [was willing
to] . . . accept the ads of all who were willing to pay the fee.151 While the City
argued this ipso facto created a non-public forum, the Seventh Circuit plainly noted
that in allow[ing] all advertisers willing to pay its fee the indiscriminate use of its
property, [the City] cannot now argue that it maintains a policy of limited access. 152
The City countered that the charging of a fee meant that access to the display
cases [was] not unlimited and, thus, a non-public forum existed.153 This argument was
erroneous. Charging a fee does not impact the analysis of whether the government
has designated a public forum at all.154 So long as a party is willing to tender[] the
140

See id. at 1151.
See id. at 115152.
142
See id. at 1151.
143
See id. at 115152.
144
See id. at 1151.
145
See id. at 1152 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788,
801 (1985)).
146
See id.
147
See id.
148
See id. at 1151. Instead of holding that OHares advertising was a designated public
forum, the appeals court remanded the case back to the district court for a final determination
due to the insufficiency of the record. See id.
149
See id. at 1154.
150
See id. at 1155.
151
See id.
152
See id.
153
See id.
154
See id.
141
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same fee required of all other advertisers, it does not matter that a fee is in place in
order to generate revenue.155 This point raises an important consideration, as most
public transit systems charge a fee to advertisers, even if it is nominal (i.e., covers
the cost of posting the advertisement sans profit).156
It is critical that courts look closely at the facts of the case to determine the
relevant forum at issue and the type of access for expressive activity demanded by
the public.157 The comparison between the district court and Seventh Circuit opinions demonstrates the peril of discounting out of hand a plaintiffs argument that a
public forum exists.158 Even if there appears to be Supreme Court precedent on point,
a full analysis must always be conducted.159
E. Christs Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority160
The facts of this Third Circuit case push the boundaries of what might be considered controversial but benign advertising. However, the First Amendment does not
discriminate.161 The Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA)
contracted with Transportation Displays Inc. (TDI) for the construction and sale of
advertising space in its stations, and in and on its vehicles.162 Christs Bride Ministries (CBM) sought to display a factually untrue advertisement163 stating that
Women Who Choose Abortion Suffer More & Deadlier Breast Cancer.164 TDI
155

See id.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Assn/Chi. Area v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d
1225, 1227 (7th Cir. 1985).
157
See, e.g., Intl Socy for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition
Auth., 691 F.2d 155, 15860 (3d Cir. 1982) (racetrack was not a public forum); Stewart v.
D.C. Armory Bd., 863 F.2d 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stadium could be a public forum but
remanded for further factual investigation); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 172 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (sidewalk outside the United States Supreme Court Building was a public forum);
Ysleta Fedn of Tchrs. v. Ysleta Ind. Sch. Dist., 720 F.2d 1429, 1429 (5th Cir. 1983) (an
internal school mail system became a public forum once the school opened [the] mail system
to all employee organizations without distinction).
158
See Air Line Pilots Assn, 45 F.3d at 1152.
159
See discussion supra Section II.D.
160
937 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1996), revd, 148 F.3d 242 (3d. Cir. 1998).
161
See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 15 (1971) (overturning the conviction
of a man who wore a jacket emblazoned with Fuck the Draft in a courthouse); Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Cohen v. California: Inconsequential Cases and Larger Principles, 74
TEX. L. REV. 1251 (1995).
162
See Christs Bride Ministries, 148 F.3d at 244.
163
See PLANNED PARENTHOOD, MYTHS ABOUT ABORTION AND BREAST CANCER (2013),
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/uploads/filer_public/af/1a/af1ae95f-de81-43dd-91a3-47
0043b06dce/myths_about_abortion_and_breast_cancer.pdf [https://perma.cc/9C4W-739J];
Christs Bride Ministries, 148 F.3d at 245.
164
See Christs Bride Ministries, 148 F.3d at 245 (the advertisement was graphically
156
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initially accepted the advertisement, to be run for one year at a cost of $3,042.60 per
month.165 The terms and conditions of the contract between CBM and TDI included
a clause that if the Transportation Facility concerned should deem such advertising
objectionable for any reason, TDI shall have the right to terminate the contract and
discontinue the service without notice.166 After the advertisements were posted,
SEPTA received numerous complaints, including rider protest and criticism by
womens health organizations and local government officials.167 Under pressure
from thenAssistant Secretary of Health Dr. Phillip Lee, SEPTA removed the advertisements.168 CBM then brought suit, alleging a violation of its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.169
F. Fire and Brimstone: Taking It Too Far for SEPTA?
The district courtin a manner similar to the district court in Air Line Pilots
Associationdismissed CBMs claims without a proper forum analysis.170 An analysis
must begin with a determination of the nature of the property and the extent of its
use for speech.171 The forum here was relatively broad, but described by the district
court as the stations in a public transit system, a public transportation system,
and SEPTAs subway and rail stations and their advertising space. 172 While the
space at issue was not a traditional public forum, that did not preclude classification as a designated public forum.173 The key factor is intent.174 SEPTA and TDI
primarily intended the advertisements to be an additional source of revenue (comprising about 0.5% of SETPAs budget).175 A secondary goal was to promote awareness of social issues and provid[e] a catalyst for change by subsidizing the cost
designed with bold white lettering on a background of black and bright red, with the word
deadlier written in red).
165
See id.
166
See id.
167
See id.
168
See id. at 24546.
169
Id. at 246.
170
Compare id. at 244, with Air Line Pilots Assn v. Dept of Aviation of Chi., 45 F.3d
1144, 1160 (7th Cir. 1995).
171
Christs Bride Ministries, 45 F.3d at 24748.
172
See id. at 248; cf. Air Line Pilots Assn, 45 F.3d at 1151 (holding that display diorama in
airport, not entire concourse, constituted the relevant forum); Lebron v. Natl R.R. Passenger
Corp., 69 F.3d 650, 655 (holding that one billboard was the relevant forum, not the entirety
of Penn Station); New York Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 123, 130 (2d
Cir. 1998) (holding that because MTA allowed both commercial and political speech, the
outside walls of MTA buses constituted a designated public forum).
173
See Christs Bride Ministries, 148 F.3d at 248.
174
See id.
175
See id. at 249.
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of advertisements addressing issues of public concern.176 The advertising space
generated a profit through expressive activity, suggesting that the government
dedicated the space to expression in the form of paid advertisements.177
On appeal, the Third Circuit dismissed SEPTAs argument that because it
retained the right in its sole discretion to reject or to remove any advertisement that
it deemed objectionable, the forum was non-public.178 The Third Circuit emphasized
that courts should not rely on the authoritys own statement of its intent because
such statements are frequently at odds with the factual nature of the inquiry.179
Additionally, reserving a right to reject advertisements for any reason at all does
not signify that no designated public forum has been created.180 While arguably
arbitrary, if the category of a designated public forum is to mean anything at all,
standards for inclusion and exclusion in a limited public forum must be unambiguous and definite. . . .181
SEPTA did have some restrictions in place, notably alcohol and tobacco
advertising beyond a specified limit and ads deemed libelous or obscene.182 However, restrictions in a designated public forum are permissible so long as they are
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.183 Generally, courts
will gloss over boilerplate restrictions, considering them as a class to be reasonable by default.184 Despite the reasonable restrictions in place, the viewpointneutral regulations did not suddenly give rise to a non-public forum. 185 Courts must
cast a skeptical eye at the transit agencys content policy and the types of content it
permits in order to be able to accurately determine the type of forum created.186
176

See id.
See id. at 250; see also Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975)
(holding municipal theaters were public forums designed for and dedicated to expressive
activities).
178
See id. at 251.
179
See id.; see also Air Line Pilots Assn v. Dept of Aviation of Chi., 45 F.3d 1144,
115354 (7th Cir. 1995); Stewart v. D.C. Armory Bd., 863 F.2d 1013, 101617 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
180
See Christs Bride Ministries, 148 F.3d at 251; see also Gregoire v. Centennial Sch.
Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1374 (3d Cir. 1990) ([I]ntent, as evidenced by a governments statements,
is a factor to be considered . . . [but] the forum inquiry does not end with the governments
statement of intent.).
181
See Christs Bride Ministries, 148 F.3d at 251 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Gregoire, 907 F.2d at 1375); see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. Fed.
Commcns Commn, 518 U.S. 727, 801 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (The power to limit or redefine fora for a specific legitimate purpose does not allow
the government to exclude certain speech or speakers from them for any reason at all.).
182
See Christs Bride Ministries, 148 F.3d at 251.
183
See Post, supra note 21, at 1748.
184
Id. at 1749; Christs Bride Ministries, 148 F.3d at 24748.
185
See Christs Bride Ministries, 148 F.3d at 251.
186
See discussion supra Section II.B.
177
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G. Four Steps to Success: The Amalgamated Majority Approach
The majority circuit approach is a four-step process.187 Through the application
of the majority approach, it is clear that public transit advertising is, in most cases,
a designated public forum.188 The majority approach acknowledges that public
transit agencies frequently do not regulate advertising in a manner consistent with
a non-public forum.189 The most common approach is essentially that mentioned by
the Seventh Circuit: public transit agencies take the ads of all who were willing to
pay the fee.190
First in a courts consideration is determining which type of forum the public
transit agency and associated advertising contractor intended to create.191 The agencys
intent, if clear, is controlling.192 To determine the agencys intent, courts should first
look to the government entitys prior practices. 193 For instance, SETPA had previously accepted a wide range of controversial advertisements.194 On the topic of
abortion, SEPTA had previously accepted pro-choice advertisements.195 SEPTA in
its history had requested modification of only three advertisements, ultimately
accepting all of them in their revised forms.196 Acceptance is strong evidence that
SEPTA had opened advertising on its property to the general public for expressive
purposes.197
In another example, the record showed that the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA)
had only twice recorded rejections of advertisements, both of which the CTA
187

See discussion infra Section II.G.
See discussion supra Section II.B.
189
See discussion supra Section II.B.
190
See Air Line Pilots Assn v. Dept of Aviation of Chi., 45 F.3d 1144, 1155 (7th Cir.
1995).
191
See id. at 1151.
192
See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 72526 (1990) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974)).
193
See Christs Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 251 (3d. Cir.
1998).
194
See id. (SEPTA allowed religious messages, such as Follow this bus to FREEDOM,
Christian Bible Fellowship Church; explicitly worded advertisements such as Safe Sex
Isnt and an advertisement urging readers that VirginityIts cool to keep.).
195
See id. at 252 (When Abortion Was Illegal, Women Died. My Mother Was One of
Them. Keep Abortion Legal and Safe. Support the Clara Bell Duvall Education Fund.).
196
See id. (One was the large wrap-around bus ad for Haynes hosiery, which would have
covered the entire bus with the picture of a scantily clad woman . . . . The same ad was
accepted as a smaller poster ad on the sides of buses. SEPTA also asked for modification of
an ad depicting a gun with a condom stretched over it. The text of the ad, Safe Sex Isnt,
ultimately ran without the graphics. SEPTA also requested that an advertisement for a personal
injury law firm delete references to rail accidents.).
197
See id.
188
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ultimately ran once confronted with legal pressure.198 The same policyor lack
thereofalso was applied to municipal airport terminals.199 The Chicago Department of Aviation appeared willing to accept advertisements from any party willing
to pay the fee.200 There was no evidence in the record that any content policy
whatsoever was considered in choosing which advertisements to accept for publication.201 Still, it is important to keep in mind that any written policy statements by the
agency are not in and of themselves determinative, and the primary factor should be
the agencys actual practices.202
Second, the types of restrictions imposed by the public transit agency and
associated advertising contractor ought to be considered. A transit agencys policy
of permitting almost unlimited access to the forum by anyone willing to pay a
specified fee is substantial evidence that it creates a designated public forum.203 Just
because a government entity exercises some restrictions does not mean that a
designated public forum does not exist.204 Certain types of restrictions can be imposed
if they are narrowly drawn to meet a compelling state interest.205 Content-neutral
regulations are permissible if they are reasonable, but the state actor cannot engage
in viewpoint discrimination.206
Generally speaking, a state actor can reasonably refuse to accept advertisements
that are plainly obscene, graphic, or impede the purpose of public transit advertising
or the transit agency itself.207 Allowing controversial advertising does not prevent
the transit agency from imposing certain restrictions on content that appear outside
the ambit of mere controversy.208 In practice, this generally means courts will not
weigh restrictions of alcohol, tobacco, and pornographic advertising as strong evidence
against the creation of a designated public forum.209

198

See Planned Parenthood Assn/Chi. Area v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225,
1230 (7th Cir. 1985).
199
See Air Line Pilots Assn v. Dept of Aviation of Chi., 45 F.3d 1144, 1155 (7th Cir.
1995).
200
See id.
201
See id.
202
See id. at 1153. But see AIDS Action Comm. of Mass. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 849
F. Supp. 79, 83 (D. Mass. 1994) (suggesting, though not holding, that the very existence of
a written policy may be a sufficient basis for finding that car interiors are not public fora).
203
See Christs Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 253 (3d Cir.
1998).
204
See id.
205
See Post, supra note 21, at 1748 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981)).
206
See id. at 1750.
207
See discussion infra Section III.B.
208
See generally discussion infra Part III.
209
See generally Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 781 F. 3d 571,
580 (1st Cir. 2015); Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2004).
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Third, the nature of the access demanded for expressive purposes must be analyzed,
taking special care not to draw the forum at issue too broadly. It is especially
important to distinguish prior Supreme Court cases about the forum at issue if they
involve a meaningful difference in expressive conduct.210 As in Air Line Pilots
Assn, even when a particular place is not a quintessential public forum, it may
become a designated public forum for a particular expressive purpose.211 If the type
of access requested is limited to commercial advertisements, then what matters is the
state actors acceptance of a broad array of commercial advertisements without any
real content policy.212 If that requirement is satisfied, a designated public forum
will be created for that limited purpose.213 Therefore, even if a court held that a
public transit system could be a non-public forum (i.e., for the purpose of collecting
signatures or distributing pamphlets), advertisements run on buses and trains may
well be because they involve an entirely different set of considerations. 214
Fourth, the court must undertake a holistic analysis of the prior factors. Based
on those facts, if the agency appears to have accepted almost anyone willing to pay
the feewhich is fairly often the casea designated public forum has been created.215 If the transit agency has seriously restricted most or all controversial advertising consistently, then a designated public forum will not have been created.216
While this is inevitably somewhat subjective, often the record on appeal can be
defective in certain critical respects. The intuitive judgments of the bench can often
be useful in directing lower courts on remand, especially as to whether a content
policy truly existed, or whether, as is often the case, it is a self-serving policy
created in anticipation of litigation.217 As the Supreme Court has wryly observed,
common sense often makes good law.218
Most cases also have a public policy rationale behind classifying public transit
advertising as a designated public forum.219 Public transit advertising remains a hot
210

See Air Line Pilots Assn v. Dept of Aviation of Chi., 45 F.3d 1144, 115152 (7th Cir.
1995) (noting the critical difference between using an airport terminal for solicitation and the
distribution of literature and using an airport terminal to display advertisements on issues of
public concern).
211
See id. at 1152 (citing Perry Educ. Assn v. Perry Loc. Educators Assn, 460 U.S. 37,
45 (1983)).
212
See id. at 1155; see also Christs Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148
F.3d 242, 251 (3d. Cir. 1998); Planned Parenthood Assn/Chi. Area v. Chicago Transit Auth.,
767 F.2d 1225, 1232 (7th Cir. 1985).
213
See Planned Parenthood Assn, 767 F.2d at 123132.
214
See discussion infra Section III.E.
215
See discussion supra Part II.
216
See discussion supra Section II.D.
217
See Air Line Pilots Assn v. Dept of Aviation of Chi., 45 F.3d 1144, 1154 (7th Cir. 1995).
218
See Peak v. United States, 353 U.S. 43, 46 (1957).
219
See generally Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (in the context
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commodity.220 Controversial advertising frequently triggers an emotional response
in viewers.221 The aim is not to polarize an audience; rather, it is to use the controversy as an attention-grabbing technique . . . to spark conversations about certain
moral values.222 Such advertisements are especially useful when they speak to a
companys values.223 One recent example occurred when Nike partnered with athlete
Colin Kaepernick after Kaepernick was released from his National Football League
contract for kneeling during the National Anthem.224 Nikes campaign was extremely successful despite its controversial nature, receiving high approval ratings
from Nikes target audience.225 Making public transit a designated public forum
allows companies to engage actively with audiences, even when that engagement
may offend those outside the target demographics.226
III. THE MINORITY CIRCUIT APPROACH
In the minority circuits, a transit agencys decision to allow the display of controversial advertising does not in and of itself establish a designated public forum.227
This perspective gives the transit agency far more leeway to restrict speech,228
resulting in content policies that may ban advertisements for a variety of reasons that

of large impersonal organizations, promoting gender equality was a compelling governmental
interest that justified restricting freedom of association); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (achieving a diverse student body in a public law school justified the governments
considering of race in admissions decisions).
220
See Nicole Perrin & Andrew Lipsman, The Renaissance of Somewhat Controversial
Public Transit Ads, EMARKETER (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.emarketer.com/content/podcast
-the-renaissance-of-somewhat-controversial-public-transit-ads [https://perma.cc/X27P-ZR2E];
J.R. Thorpe, The 7 Most Notable Subway Ad Controversies, BUSTLE (Nov. 16, 2015), https://
www.bustle.com/articles/123328-the-7-most-notable-subway-advertisement-controversies
[https://perma.cc/E5P6-UGY3].
221
See Tom Salvat, When (and How) to Effectively Use Controversial Advertising, CONCURED (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.concured.com/blog/when-and-how-to-effectively-use
-controversial-advertising [https://perma.cc/BP3M-96LU].
222
See id.
223
See id.
224
See E. J. Schultz, New Poll Lends More Evidence that Nike Scored with Kaepernick
Ad, ADAGE (Sept. 13, 2018), https://adage.com/article/cmo-strategy/poll-shows-approval
-nike-s-kaepernick-ad/314924 [https://perma.cc/WCL6-5BY6].
225
Id.
226
See discussion supra Section II.D.
227
See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 781 F. 3d 571, 580 (1st
Cir. 2015).
228
See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. King Cnty., 136 S. Ct. 1022, 1025 (2016) (Thomas,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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could be deemed subjective.229 The result is that, much like a private landowner, a
public transit system may permit or deny applications for advertising in any manner
it sees fit, so long as the regulation is reasonable and not an arbitrary suppression
of a speakers viewpoint.230 Cases from the First Circuit will be used to demonstrate
the weaknesses of the minority circuit approach.
A. Ridley v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority 231
The Ridley case involved a consolidation of two appeals, the Change the Climate
appeal232 and the Ridley appeal.233 Both appeals involved controversial advertisements rejected by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA).234
Similar to other public transit systems, the principal purpose of the MBTA advertising program was to generate and maximize revenue, and the MBTA was
directed to provide for the maximization of non-transportation revenues from all
sources.235 In pursuit of this goal, the MBTA contracted with Viacom Outdoor of
Braintree (Viacom) to sell advertising space consisting of interior car card displays in buses, trains, and trolleys.236 The Change the Climate campaign involved
three distinct advertisements, run as part of a provocative advertising campaign[]
in order to generate debate about the laws criminalizing the use of marijuana.237
The Ridley ad involved a text display which stated in part The Bible says in Rev
12:9 And Satan which deceiveth the whole world. . . . There is only one true
religion. All the rest are false.238 In 1992, the MBTA first adopted guidelines in an
attempt to limit the types of advertisements it would accept.239 Both advertisements
eventually were rejected under the MBTAs 2003 guidelines.240
229

See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. King Cnty., No. C13-1804RAJ, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11982, at *5 (W.D. Wash. 2014), affd, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14098 (9th Cir. 2015).
230
See Post, supra note 21, at 1750.
231
390 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2004).
232
See generally Change the Climate, Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 214 F. Supp. 2d
125 (D. Mass. 2002).
233
See Ridley, 390 F.3d at 70 (Ridley noted that the outcome of the forum issue in Change
the Climate would govern the Ridley case; additionally, common issues of fact and law were
present and the same lawyers represented both plaintiffs).
234
See id. at 69.
235
See id. at 72.
236
See id.
237
See id. at 7273 (for instance, [t]he first advertisement, (the Teen Ad), was a color
photograph of a teenage girl with a baseball cap on backwards, with a caption saying:
Smoking pot is not cool, but were not stupid, ya know. Marijuana is NOT cocaine or
heroin. Tell us the truth . . . .).
238
See id. at 74.
239
See id. at 72.
240
See id. at 75.
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B. A Double Hitter: The MBTA Versus Shock Advertising
The First Circuit has adopted an approach distinct from that of other circuits in
determining that public transit advertising is a non-public forum.241 The MBTAs
2003 guidelines stated that the MBTA intended that its facilities constituted nonpublic forums that are subject to . . . viewpoint-neutral restrictions. 242 However,
it must be noted that a policy statement by the agency is not determinative of the
forum analysis.243 The MBTAs initial content policy prohibited all tobacco advertisements, as well as all libelous, slanderous, or obscene ads.244 After a revision in
1992, other restrictions were implemented by the MBTA, mostly related to depictions of violence, unlawful activity, or the denigration of protected classes of people.245
The First Circuit noted that [b]y refusing to limit the advertising program solely to
commercial advertising, the MBTA was, thus, not evidencing an intent to open the
forum to all public discourse, and held the MBTA had created a non-public forum.246
It is unclear why First Circuit assumed that the MBTAs narrow restrictions on
the types of content it would accept were decisive evidence of an intent to create a
non-public forum. Obscenity,247 libel,248 and slander249 already are de jure outside
the ambit of First Amendment protection and, thus, prohibitions on them would not
be relevant to the forum analysis at all. Additionally, restrictions on the promotion
of violent speech are permitted in limited circumstances without running afoul of the
First Amendment.250 As in Lehman, the public transit agency could place some
reasonable viewpoint-neutral restrictions on the types of content it was willing to
accept without necessarily creating a non-public forum.251
241

See id. at 82; Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 781 F.3d 571,
582 (1st Cir. 2015).
242
See Ridley, 390 F.3d at 77.
243
See id.; see also Christs Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242,
249 (3d Cir. 1998).
244
See Ridley, 390 F.3d at 77.
245
See id. at 7778.
246
See id. at 81.
247
See generally Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
248
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 27980 (1964) (placing libel outside
the protection of the First Amendment in cases involving public figures when actual malice
is shown); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (allowing state law to
govern libel cases if the plaintiff is a private person, with actual malice not required). See
generally Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
249
See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342 (interpreting the central holding from New York Times Co.).
250
See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that speech which
promotes imminent lawless action is not constitutionally protected); Hess v. Indiana, 414
U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam) (affirming Brandenburg by refusing to punish speech that
advocated illegal action which may take place in the unforeseeable future).
251
See Planned Parenthood Assn/Chi. Area v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225,
1227, 1233 (7th Cir. 1985).
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The First Circuit seemed to misread Lehman by stating that it is indistinguishable from Ridley.252 Lehman involved a categorical choice to limit car card space
to innocuous and less controversial commercial and service oriented advertising by
excluding all public interest advertising.253 In Ridley, an erratically enforced254
written policy was used only seventeen times total in the years prior to litigation, in
a manner that was at times contradictory.255 The limitations did not appear to be
unambiguous and definite.256 Additionally, the MBTA explicitly refused to limit the
forum solely to commercial advertising.257 The General Manager of MBTA noted
that we . . . are performing a public service in another flavor rather than [solely being
a] transportation service. Were letting [the public] know about government services
or social services or not-for-profit services that might have a direct impact on their
quality of life.258 This is the exact kind of advertising limited by the City of Shaker
Heights in the Lehman case, making the circumstances facially distinguishable.259
As noted by the dissent in Ridley, much of the MBTAs justification for refusing
to accept the plaintiffs advertisements relied on an extremely nebulous prevailing
community standard for demeaning or disparaging expression.260 The written policy
as applied to advertisements was simply not the type of unambiguous and definite
policy that defines a non-public forum.261 While the erratic enforcement of a policy
would not matter if a government had not intentionally opened a forum to public
discourse, the evidence in the record showeddespite the MBTAs stated policythat the MBTA had intentionally opened the forum to the general public for
expressive purposes, including public interest advertising.262 While convincingly
252

See Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 78 (1st Cir. 2004).
See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974).
254
See Ridley, 390 F.3d at 78.
255
See id. at 78 n.5 (For instance, the MBTA refused to accept an advisement depicting a
couple smoking and encouraging the responsible disposal of cigarette butts, citing its guidelines
on tobacco use. Despite this, the MBTA later accepted an advertisement for the airline Al
Italia which contained a picture of a woman on a motorcycle with a cigarette in one hand.).
256
See Christs Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 251 (3d. Cir.
1998). See generally Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727
(1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
257
See Ridley, 390 F.3d at 7879.
258
See id. at 81.
259
See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 299300 (1974) (limiting
political advertising).
260
See Ridley, 390 F.3d at 98 (Torruella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
261
See Christs Bride Ministries, 148 F.3d at 251 (quoting Gregoire v. Centennial Sch.
Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1375 (3d Cir. 1990)).
262
See Ridley, 390 F.3d at 82 (The court still found to the contrary in analyzing the circumstances, stating that the MBTAs policy clearly evinced an intent to maintain control over
the forum, and thus the MBTA did not create a designated public forum. As a result, the
standard of review is not strict scrutiny.) (emphasis added).
253
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written, the First Circuit decision failed to properly distinguish Lehman, and in
doing so came to an incorrect conclusion.263
C. American Freedom Defense Initiative v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority264
In the follow-up case to Ridley, the First Circuit affirmed Ridley and doubled
down on the premise that the MBTAs advertising was a non-public forum.265 The
dispute revolved around a pair of advertisements, one offered by the Committee for
Peace in Israel and Palestine (Committee for Peace) in support of the Palestinian
position,266 and another offered by the American Freedom Defense Initiative (AFDI)
in support of the Israeli position.267 The AFDI ran its advertisement in response to
the MBTA accepting the Committee for Peaces advertisement.268 Another pro-Israel
advertisement was accepted for publication at roughly the same time.269 The MBTA
had not made substantial substantive changes since the Ridley case, and accepted the
Committee for Peaces advertisement at the standard commercial rate.270 However,
citing the MBTAs prohibition on advertisement[s] contain[ing] material that
demeans or disparages an individual or group of individuals, the MBTA declined
to run the AFDIs responsive advertisement.271
D. Back for Round Two: The MBTA Doubles Down
The First Circuit, relying on the premise that a governmental proprietor creates
a designated public forum only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum
for public discourse, reaffirmed Ridley and struck down the AFDIs constitutional
263

See id. at 78.
781 F.3d 571 (1st Cir. 2015).
265
See id. at 579.
266
See id. at 574 (The advertisement depicted four maps reflecting different points in
time with the caption, Palestinian Loss of Land1946 to 2010. The advertisement also contained bold text to the right of the maps stating that 4.7 Million Palestinians are Classified
by the U.N. as Refugees.).
267
See id. at 575 (The advertisement, a modified version of a quotation from the political
theorist and novelist Ayn Rand, stated: In any war between the civilized man and the savage,
support the civilized man. Support Israel. Defeat jihad.).
268
See id. at 57576.
269
See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 989 F. Supp. 2d 182, 185
(D. Mass. 2013) (An advertisement offered by the organization Stand With Us stated that
Jews are Indigenous to Israel and depict[ing] a series of maps that indicate[d] that Israel
is geographically smaller than the ancient Jewish Kingdom or the internationally recognized
Jewish homeland as of 1920.).
270
See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative, 781 F.3d at 57475.
271
See id. (alterations in original).
264
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claims.272 However, the rationale for taking the position that the MBTA created a
non-public forum was even more questionable given the unflattering facts of this
particular case.273 As noted in the dissent, [b]y opening up its advertising facilities
to controversial topics of the gravest political issues of our day, the MBTA has
created a designated public forum for speech, not a nonpublic forum.274
Relying heavily on the precedent set by Ridley, the First Circuit stated that the
display of controversial advertising does not in and of itself establish a designated
public forum.275 However, whether or not the advertisements were controversial was
not the relevant issue.276 The relevant issue was instead whether the MBTA accepted
other types of political advertising, which it clearly did.277 The MBTA, while
accepting other controversial advertisements on the Israel-Palestine issue, decided
by fiat that the advertisement the AFDI sought to run was simply too controversial
despite being willing previously to run a functionally identical advertisementjust
on the other side of the debate.278 While the MBTA may claim to have created a
non-public forum, the existence of some restrictions does not mean that a designated public forum does not exist.279 In Lehman, Shaker Heights had not opened up
its transit vehicles to any exchange or presentation of ideas, political or otherwise,
which was essentially a ban on all political speech.280 The MBTA wanted to have
its cake and eat it too, which is not how public forum doctrine functions. 281
The MBTA made its facilities the modern analogue to traditional public forum
through largely hands-off content policies.282 The First Circuit fell into a wellcriticized trap of public-forum doctrine in that it allowed the governments own selfserving statements about its intended use for a public place to outweigh the forums
inherent attributes.283 By giving too much weight to the governments defined
272

See id. at 57980 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 802 (1985)).
273
See id. at 589 (Stahl, J., dissenting).
274
See id. (Stahl, J., dissenting).
275
See id. at 580 (citing Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 8182 (1st Cir.
2004)).
276
See id. at 581.
277
See id. at 57476.
278
See id. at 576 (A revised version of the AFDI ad the MBTA was willing to run stated:
In any war between the civilized man and those engaged in savage acts, support the
civilized man. Defeat violent jihad. Support Israel.).
279
See Christs Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 253 (3d. Cir.
1998).
280
See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, N.E.2d 683, 685 (Ohio 1973).
281
See Lidsky, supra note 43, at 4; see also Perry Educ. Assn v. Perry Loc. Educators
Assn, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
282
See Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 108 (1st Cir. 2004) (Torruella,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
283
See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative, 781 F.3d at 592 (Stahl, J., dissenting). See generally
Farber & Nowak, supra note 57.

494

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:467

purpose for the property, the First Circuit left the MBTA with almost unlimited
authority to restrict speech on its property by doing nothing more than articulating
a non-speech-related purpose for the area. . . .284 Similar to the airport at issue in
Lee, a public transit system is one of the few government-owned spaces where
many persons have extensive contact with other members of the public, and this
important avenue for speech should not be closed off to the general public on the
whim of a public official.285
E. Fundamentally Inconsistent: The Amalgamated Minority Approach
The rationale underlying the minority approach seems to be that because a
public transit system has, in the past, exercised some limited amount of control over
the types of advertising content accepted for publication, this ipso facto gives rise
to a non-public forum.286 The minority approach focuses on the principle of selective access, ignoring the issue that access does not appear to be particularly selective.287 The MBTAs guidelines appeared primarily targeted at types of content already
beyond the protection of the First Amendment, or content which reasonably would
impair the core goal of the forum (expression in the form of paid advertisements). 288
As noted repeatedly by the dissent in American Freedom Defense Initiative, a
designated public forum arises when the governmental entity affirmatively opens
up its facilities to advertisements concerning civic or political issues. . . .289 While
it is understandable why public transit systems are covetous of the ability to freely
pick-and-choose the advertisements they accept, the First Amendment holds them
to a high standard.290 Once the floodgates of public interest advertising are open, the
public transit agency can no longer attempt to channel the floodwaters. 291
IV. GOVERNMENT SPEECH
A. Government Speech Generally
Public transit systems are owned by the government, and thus naturally the
advertising the transit system carries must be evaluated in the context of the government
284

See Intl Socy for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 695 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
285
Id. at 698 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
286
See Ridley, 390 F.3d at 102.
287
See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative, 781 F.3d at 581.
288
See id. at 583.
289
See id. at 592 (Stahl, J., dissenting).
290
See discussion infra Part IV.
291
See discussion infra Section IV.B.
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speech doctrine.292 The government speech doctrine is a body of precedent that
generally shields the governments own expression from Free Speech Clause
challenge[s] by those who object to the governments views.293 Government speech
can be categorized broadly, but includes the collective speech of a government
agency, its representatives (like the Secretary of Defense), or an individual speaking
while backed by the governments power (like a Child Protective Services caseworker speaking to a parent).294 The general public has relatively little recourse
when unhappy with their governments speech; courts have deemed the ballot box
the primary remedy.295 Therefore, if the government speech doctrine were applicable
to public transit advertising, there might arise a potential issue preventing plaintiffs
from reaching the meat of the First Amendment issues present in any given case. 296
As early as 1973, it was recognized by the Supreme Court that [g]overnment
is not restrained by the First Amendment from controlling its own expression. 297
In 1990, the Supreme Court further observed that [i]f every citizen were to have a
right to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern to the public would be limited to those
in the private sector. . . .298 By 2005, in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, the Supreme Court rejected a private partys First Amendment claim expressly
on the grounds that the contested speech was actually the governments.299 Johanns
was then affirmed unanimously in the 2009 decision Pleasant Grove City v. Summum.300 Summum involved an attempt by the Summum religious group to erect a
privately funded stone monument inscribed with the Seven Aphorisms of Summum
in a public park.301 The city of Pleasant Grove, Utah, denied the monument because
of a desire to limit monuments in the park to those that either directly related to the
history of Pleasant Grove or were donated by groups with long-standing ties to the
Pleasant Grove community.302 Because permanent monuments displayed on public
292

See Coleman v. Ann Arbor Transp. Auth., 904 F. Supp. 2d 670, 696 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
See HELEN NORTON, THE GOVERNMENTS SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION 5 (2019). See
generally Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expressions Source,
88 B.U. L. REV. 587 (2008); Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Governments Control of Its Workers Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1 (2009).
294
See NORTON, THE GOVERNMENTS SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 293,
at 3.
295
See id. at 6.
296
See generally id.
297
See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Natl Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 140 n.7 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
298
See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 1213 (1990).
299
See 544 U.S. 550, 550 (2005).
300
See 555 U.S. 460, 460 (2009).
301
See id. at 465.
302
See id. at 46465 (The park at issue in the case contained, at the time of litigation, fifteen
permanent displays, at least eleven of which were donated by private groups or individuals.).
293
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property typically represent government speech, the Supreme Court recognized that
Pleasant Grove could exercise discretion in accepting monuments for display in the
park and reject the display offered by Summum.303
B. Government Speech and Public Transit Advertising
Applying Summum, the Court held in the 2015 case of Walker v. Texas Division,
Sons of Confederate Veterans that forum analysis is inappropriate in government
speech cases.304 A government entity may exercise [its] freedom to express its views
even when it receives assistance from private sources for the purpose of delivering a
government-controlled message.305 Because of the nature of the state-issued license
plates at issue in Walker, it was reasonable to assume the message on the plate would
be interpreted as being convey[ed] . . . on the [issuers] behalf.306 Therefore, Texas
offering plates emblazoned with Fight Terrorism does not obligate Texas to also issue
plates promoting al-Qaida or the Muslim Brotherhood as a form of balancing
speech.307 However, government speech should not be read too broadly. The First Circuit noted in In re Tam that, in striking down the anti-disparagement clause of the
Lanham Act, the only message [trademark registration] conveys is that a mark is
registered.308 Thus, it is important to evaluate the following factors when evaluating
whether speech is government speech in the context of the public forum: (1) whether
the speech has the intent and effect of delivering the governments message; (2)
whether the contested speech is closely identified with the government by the public;
(3) whether the government had historically used the speech in question for its own
expressive purposes; and (4) the practical implications of denying the government
the power to control the contested speech.309
The government speech doctrine becomes relevant to the discussion of public
transit systems because most systems operate as some form of government agency
or public-private partnership.310 The existence of relationships between the public
transit agencies and the advertising agencies that generally run the ads are the
303

See id. at 46972.
See 135 S. Ct. 2239, 224647 (2015).
305
See id. at 2251 (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 468).
306
See id. at 2249 (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 471).
307
See id.
308
808 F.3d 1321, 1346 (1st Cir. 2015); see also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1758 (2017).
309
See generally Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expressions
Source, supra note 293, at 59798.
310
FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMIN., Public Transit in the United States (last updated in 2015),
https://www.transit.dot.gov/regulations-and-guidance/environmental-programs/public-transit
-united-states [https://perma.cc/B6YX-7CRZ] (last visited Dec. 13, 2021) (Fare box revenues
on average account for only 40 percent of system operating costs. Transit systems receive
funds from the Federal, state, and local levels, and private sector sources, and it remains
essentially a public service that is provided and managed locally.).
304
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quintessential state participation contemplated by cases such as Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority.311 An advertising agency may also be entwined
with the government actor, another route through which state action applies.312
However, it is clear that public transit agency advertisements are not government speech in light of the general analysis for government speech proposed by
Helen Norton.313 The speech is not intended to deliver the governments message;
it delivers the message of a private party.314 The message is far more likely to be
identified with the advertised company or brand than the government.315 The government has not historically used public transit advertising to convey messages for its
own purposes (outside of particular wartime advertisements that were distributed
widely using every available means).316 Finally, the implications of denying the government the power to control the speech seem to be limited, with existing First
Amendment exceptions sufficient to deal with most dangers.317
A clear application of the government speech analysis can be seen in Coleman
v. Ann Arbor Transportation Authority.318 The case involved a plaintiff attempting
to place an advertisement for display on the exterior of buses of the Ann Arbor
Transportation Authority.319 The court noted that there is a substantial difference
between monuments located in public parks, and advertisements placed on public
buses.320 There is no authority that indicates that the speech in ads on transit
authority buses [is] reasonably attributable to the transit authority.321 Even if private
speech takes place on government property, that does not automatically create
government speech.322 An additional element that could create government speech
is a long tradition of the government using the private speech to speak to the
311

See generally 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (explaining that when a state leases public property
to a private entity and forms a relationship of interdependence with that entity, the private
lessee becomes a state actor for purposes of applying constitutional law); Jackson v. Metro.
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
312
See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Assn, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001).
See generally Christopher W. Schmidt, On Doctrinal Confusion: The Case of the State
Action Doctrine, 2016 BYU L. REV. 575 (2016).
313
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public, or the government generally dictating the overarching message with the
power to approve every word.323 This phenomenon is not generally found in the
context of public transit advertising.
Therefore, the government speech issue is inapplicable to public transit advertising.324 As a result, it will not bar the suits of plaintiffs aggrieved by decisions of
public transit agencies regarding what types of content to accept in advertisements.325
V. THE CAPTIVITY ISSUE
A. Captivity Generally
Riding a bus, train, or trolley involves being stuck in a metal tube for the
duration of ones journey. Naturally, courts will look to see whether those circumstances are sufficient to make transit riders a captive audience.326 The captive
audience doctrine is designed to protect recipients against being held captive to
unwanted or offensive speech.327 This doctrine has been most often applied in the
context of private homes.328 However, it also has been applied beyond the context
of the home to certain situations where individuals are confined for an extended
period of time.329
B. Captivity and Public Transit Advertising
The driving concern behind the Supreme Courts decision in Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights was that streetcar riders constituted a captive audience.330 This view
is particularly prominent in the concurrence of Justice Douglas, who stated that if
we are to turn a bus or streetcar into either a newspaper or a park, we [must] take
great liberties with people who because of necessity become commuters and at the
323

See Coleman, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 697 (quoting ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d
370, 375 (6th Cir. 2006)).
324
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See discussion infra Conclusion.
326
See White Coat Waste Project v. Greater Richmond Transit Co., 463 F. Supp. 3d 661,
70506 (E.D. Va. 2020); Orazio v. North Hempstead, 426 F. Supp. 1144, 1148 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
327
See generally Patrick Garry, Captive Audience Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence (2006) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2280740.
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See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting the
use of sound trucks, stating that citizens in their homes should be protected from the invasion
of loud and raucous noises beyond their control).
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same time captive viewers or listeners.331 Given the nature of the audience at
issuestreetcar riders unable to feasibly choose other modes of transportation
Justice Douglas believed that an advertiser ought to have no right to force his
message upon an audience incapable of declining to receive it.332
Lehman necessarily stands for the proposition that the right of the commuters
to be free from forced intrusions on their privacy prevents a city from deliberately
using public transit as a forum[] for the dissemination of ideas upon this captive
audience.333 Ultimately, because streetcar riders are a captive audience, restrictions
on political advertisements played over speaker systems in public transit vehicles
were held to be constitutionally permissible.334 The Lehman decision has been cited
in later cases involving advertising on public transit, notably by a district court in
the First Circuit.335
As the Supreme Court has recognized previously, individuals riding public
transportation are captives and, therefore, unable to avoid objectionable speech. 336
However, the Court has noted that members of the public are often captives
outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech. 337 Outside
of the sacred curtilage of the home, [t]he ability of government, consonant with the
Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other
words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being
invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.338 This important limitation prevents
empower[ing] a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal
predilections.339
In the case of public transit advertising, controversial advertising need not
necessarily run afoul of the captive audience doctrine.340 As noted by the Court, the
government cannot automatically shut off discourse solely to protect others from
hearing it.341 Likewise, a principal function of free speech . . . is to invite dispute.342
Indeed, speech may best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
331

See id. at 30607 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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anger.343 This is not to say that reasonable limits may not be imposed, as per FCC
v. Pacifica Foundation, because the governments ability to regulate plainly obscene
advertising in a public forum is not impeded.344 If there is a certain threshold of
controversy too great for a public transit agencys ridership to bear, nothing prevents
a public transit agency from rejecting advertising in a matter that is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.345
The district court in Planned Parenthood Association v. Chicago Transit Authority
touched on the pragmatic application of the captivity issue to public transit advertising.346 The standard employed is that the party asserting the captivity doctrine must
show that the medium is so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling
individual to avoid exposure to it.347 While public transit vehicles are more confining
than an ordinary public street, there is nothing about the medium of advertising via
car cards and exterior advertisements that makes it impossible for an unwilling
individual to avert their eyes.348 This option to ignore content may be contrasted
with the advertisements played over loudspeaker at issue in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, which were genuinely unavoidable without carrying earmuffs.349 The
court ultimately held that it was impossible for the CTA to justify its content-based
regulation on the basis of the captivity doctrine because it was not impossible for
CTA riders to avert their eyes from the printed message PPA seeks to deliver. 350
That is not to say the ambit of the public forum doctrine is unlimited. When a
compelling state interest exists, restricting advertising obviously intended to inflame
or offend may be justified to spare the riders of public transit from hateful content.
Some balance must be struck to guard against advertisements designed simply to
troll the viewer rather than spark a spirited and civil discussion. Free speech is a
vital principle but does not occur in a vacuum. It must be balanced with other vital
principles such as diversity, tolerance, and civic unity, particularly when that speech
has the air of government sponsorship. As is said by some political commentators,
[f]ree speech doesnt mean speech free from all consequences.351 How exactly to
construe that line, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
343
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CONCLUSION
While the future of public transit ridership faces challenges due to the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic, there is a renewed focus on increased funding for public
transit in communities across the United States.352 This expectation that ad placements will increase means it is more important than ever to ensure that courts respect
the principles of the First Amendment when evaluating the advertising polices of
public transit agencies.353 While many public transit agencies do have self-serving
policies on the record, such policies often are enforced in inconsistent or contradictory manners against individuals whose speech is unpopular.354 This pick-and-choose
approach is plainly unconstitutional.355 If public transit agencies allow some public
interest advertising, they lose the ability to act arbitrarily as a gatekeeper.356 While
this view may be harsh, the Constitution demands a higher standard.357
When public transit agencies do not have strictly enforced, written content
policies deliberately excluding public interest and other types of controversial
advertising, they create a designated public forum. In doing so, the agency loses the
ability to impose restrictions other than those that are content-neutral and are reasonably tailored to a compelling government interest. That is the view of the majority
of circuit courts in the United States, and it should eventually be adopted by the
Supreme Court should an opportunity for certiorari again present itself.
The majority circuit approach is best described as a four-part analysis. 358 First,
the nature of the public forum at issue must be considered, with extreme care taken
to precisely define the scope so that it is not overbroad.359 Second, the type of access
requested by the general public should be closely scrutinized, because designated
public forums may be open to some forms of expressive activity but not others.360
Third, the court should analyze the public transit agencys prior practices to determine its intent, keeping in mind that any written policy statements are not, in and of
352
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themselves, determinative of the type of forum created.361 Fourth, based on those
facts, if the agency appears to have accepted almost anyone willing to pay the fee
almost always the case upon close scrutiny of past practicesa designated public
forum exists.362 This organic, fact-intensive analysis calls for intense judicial
scrutiny in order to ensure that constitutional rights are given the proper deference
and respect.363
The government speech issue does not seem to apply to public transit advertising cases.364 Unlike in Summum or Walker, it is clear that public transit advertising
does not represent government speech.365 In accepting the advertising, the public
transit agency merely generates revenue by conveying a message on behalf of
others.366 Generally speaking, the speech or content in advertisements on transit
authority property is not reasonably attributable to the transit authority itself; the
advertiser itself is the party that stands to gain or lose from public discourse. 367
Further, even if private speech takes place on government property, that does not
create government speech absent other factors like the government dictating the
overarching message of the speech.368 As this is almost never the case, the constitutional issues of government speech are not applicable to public transit advertising.369
The captivity issue may be present to an extent in public transit ridership, but
not to an extent that justifies tyrannical restrictions to protect a captive audience.370
Controversial speech is important, and allowing free and open promotion of views
that may be unpopular is valuable to public discourse.371 Public interest groups and
other organizations must be allowed, in a democratic society, to go where the
eyeballs are.372 To restrict good-faith messaging stifles civic discussion necessary
to develop and maintain an informed populace.373 So long as it is possible for public
transit riders to look away from advertising, they are not a truly captive audience.374
Transit agencies should allow the advertising they carry to be used for a variety
of purposes. Allowing content-based restrictions potentially can prevent important
messaging that some viewers may find uncomfortable from being distributed. One
361
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364
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367
368
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370
371
372
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can conceive of positions on important issues (such as allowing for same-sex
marriage or promoting condom use) that once were (and in some quarters, remain)
deeply controversial. Making public transit advertising a designated public forum
maximizes free speech without overly harming the mission of the advertising itself
(that is, to generate additional revenue to fund transit operations). In the modern era,
advertising serves an important public and civic purpose. By adopting the reasoning
of the majority of circuit courts, this Note hopes the Supreme Court can give public
transit advertising the legal recognition it deserves.

